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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the secrecy capacity of a point-to-point, full-duplex (FD) wirelesly powered
communication system in the presence of a passive eavesdropper (EVE). The considered system is comprised
of an energy transmitter (ET), an energy harvesting user (EHU), and a passive EVE. The ET transmits radio-
frequency energy, which is used for powering the EHU as well as for generating interference at the EVE.
The EHU uses the energy harvested from the ET to transmit confidential messages back to the ET. As a
consequence of the FD mode of operation, both the EHU and the ET are subjected to self-interference,
which has different effects at the two nodes. In particular, the self-interference impairs the decoding of the
received message at the ET, whilst it serves as an additional energy source at the EHU. For this system model,
we derive an upper and a lower bound on the secrecy capacity. For the lower bound, we propose a simple
achievability scheme. Our numerical results show significant improvements in terms of achievable secrecy rate
when the proposed communication scheme is employed against its half-duplex counterpart, even for practical
self-interference values at the ET.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of wireless communication is of critical societal interest. Traditionally, encryption
has been the primary method which ensures that only the legitimate receiver receives the intended
message. Encryption algorithms commonly require that some information, colloquially referred to as
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2a key, is shared only among the legitimate entities in the network. However, key management makes
the encryption impractical in architectures such as radio-frequency identification (RFID) networks and
sensor networks, since certificate authorities or key distributers are often not available and limitations
in terms of computational complexity make the use of standard data encryption difficult [1], [2]. This
problem with network security will be increasingly emphasised in the foreseeable future because of
paradigms such as the Internet of Things (IoT). The IoT, as a “network of networks”, will provide
ubiquitous connectivity and information-gathering capabilities to a massive number of communication
devices. However, the low-complexity hardware and the severe energy constraints of the IoT devices
present unique security challenges. To ensure confidentiality in such networks, exploitation of the
physical properties of the wireless channel has become an attractive option [2]. Essentially, the
presence of fading, interference, and path diversity in the wireless channel can be leveraged in order
to degrade the ability of potential intruders to gain information about the confidential messages sent
through the wireless channel [2]. This approach is commonly known as physical layer security, or
alternatively as information-theoretic security [3].
Shannon and Wyner have laid a solid foundation for studying secrecy of many different system
models in [4],[5], including communication systems powered by energy harvesting (EH), which have
attracted significant attention recently [6], [7]. EH relies on harvesting energy from ambient renewable
and environmentally friendly sources such as, solar, thermal, vibration or wind, or, from dedicated
energy transmitters. The latter gives rise to wirelesly powered communication networks (WPCNs)
[8]. EH is often considered as a suitable supplement to IoT networks, since most IoT nodes have
low power requirements on the order of microwatts to milliwatts, which can be easily met by EH.
In addition, when paired with physical layer security, WPCNs can potentially offer a secure and
ubiquitous operation [9]. An EH network with multiple power-constrained information sources has
been studied in [10], where the authors derived an exact expression for the probability of a positive
secrecy capacity. In [11] and [12], the secrecy capacity of the EH Gaussian multiple-input-multiple-
output (MIMO) wire-tap channel under transmitter- and receiver-side power constraints has been
derived. The secrecy outage probability of a single-input-multiple-output (SIMO) and multiple-input-
single-output (MISO) simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) systems were
characterized in [13] and [14]-[15], respectively. Secrecy in SWIPT systems has also been studied in
[16], [17]. Relaying networks with EH in the presence of a passive eavesdropper have been studied
in [18]. Defence methods with EH friendly jammers, have been proposed in [19] and [20], where the
secrecy capacity and the secrecy outage probability have been derived.
3In addition to physical layer security, another appealing option for networks with scarce resources
such as WPCNs, is the full-duplex (FD) mode of operation. Recent results in the literature, e.g.,
[21], [22], [23], [24], have shown that it is possible for transceivers to operate in the FD mode by
transmitting and receiving signals simultaneously and in the same frequency band. The FD mode of
operation can lead to doubling (or even tripling, see [25]) of the spectral efficiency of the network in
question.
Motivated by these advances in FD communication and the applicability of physical layer security to
WPCNs, in this paper, we investigate the secrecy capacity of a FD wirelessly powered communication
system.Unlike our prior work in [26] which does not have an eavesdropper and therefore does not
consider secrecy constraints, the network in this paper is comprised of an energy transmitter (ET) and
an energy harvesting user (EHU) in the presence of a passive eavesdropper (EVE). The objective in
this paper is to investigate the secrecy capacity and develop novel communication schemes capable
of achieving non-zero secrecy rates. As a result, the achievability schemes presented in this paper
are different than the achievability schemes in [26]. In this system, the ET sends radio-frequency
(RF) energy to the EHU, whereas, the EHU harvests this energy and uses it to transmit confidential
information back to the ET. The signal transmitted by the ET serves a second purpose by acting as
an interference signal for EVE. Both the ET and the EHU are assumed to operate in the FD mode,
hence, both nodes transmit and receive RF signals in the same frequency band and at the same time.
As a result, both are subjected to self-interference. The self-interference hinders the decoding of the
information signal received from the EHU at the ET. At the EHU, the self-interference resulting from
the simultaneous transmission and reception increases the amount of energy that can be harvested
by the EHU [27]. Meanwhile, EVE is passive and only aims to intercept the confidential message
transmitted by the EHU to the ET. For the considered system model, we derive an upper and a lower
bound on the secrecy capacity. Furthermore, we provide a simple achievability scheme for the lower
bound on the secrecy capacity. The proposed scheme in this paper is relatively simple and therefore
easily applicable in practice in wirelessly powered IoT networks which require secure information
transmissions. For example, sensors which are embedded in the infrastructure, like buildings, bridges
or the power grid, monitor their environment and generate measurements. The generated measurements
often contain sensitive information. An Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) can fly close to the sensors
in order to power them, and then receive the generated data packets from the sensors. The proposed
scheme in this paper can be used in this scenario and it will guarantees that such sensitive information
will never be intercepted by an illegitimate, third party.
4The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the system and channel models.
Sections III and IV present the upper and the lower bounds on the secrecy capacity, respectively.
In Section V, we provide numerical results and we conclude the paper in Section VI. Proofs of
theorems/lemmas are provided in the Appendices.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a system model comprised of an EHU, an ET, and an EVE. In order to improve the
spectral efficiency of the considered system, both the EHU and the ET are assumed to operate in the
FD mode, i.e., both nodes transmit and receive RF signals simultaneously and in the same frequency
band. Thereby, the EHU receives energy signals from the ET and simultaneously transmits information
signals to the ET. Similarly, the ET transmits energy signals to the EHU and simultaneously receives
information signals from the EHU. The signal transmitted from the ET also serves as interference to
the EVE, and thereby increases its noise floor. Due to the FD mode of operation, both the EHU and
the ET are subjected to self-interference, which has opposite effects at the two nodes, respectively.
More precisely, the self-interference signal has a negative effect at the ET since it hinders the decoding
of the information signal received from the EHU. As a result, the ET should be designed with a self-
interference suppression apparatus, which can suppress the self-interference at the ET and thereby
improve the decoding of the desired signal received from the EHU. On the other hand, at the EHU,
the self-interference signal is desired since it increases the amount of energy that can be harvested
by the EHU. Hence, the EHU should be designed without a self-interference suppression apparatus
in order for the energy contained in the self-interference signal to be harvested, i.e., the EHU should
perform energy recycling as proposed in [27]. Meanwhile, EVE remains passive and only receives,
thus it is not subjected to self-interference.
A. Channel Model
Let V12i and V21i denote random variables (RVs) which model the fading channel gains of the
EHU-ET and ET-EHU channels in channel use i, respectively. Due to the FD mode of operation, the
EHU-ET and the ET-EHU channels are identical and as a result the channel gains V12i and V21i are
assumed to be identical, i.e., V12i = V21i = Vi. Moreover, let Fi and Gi denote RVs which model the
fading channel gains of the EHU-EVE and ET-EVE channels in channel use i, respectively. We assume
that all channel gains follow a block-fading model, i.e., they remain constant during all channel uses
in one block, but change from one block to the next, where each block consists of (infinitely) many
channel uses. All three nodes are assumed to have a priori knowledge of the CSI of the EHU-ET
5channel, i.e., Vi. In addition, EVE is assumed to have CSI of the the EHU-EVE and the ET-EVE
channels, given by Gi and Fi, respectively.
In the i-th channel use, let the transmit symbols at the EHU and the ET be modeled as RVs,
denoted by X1i and X2i, respectively. Moreover, in channel use i, let the received symbols at the
EHU, the ET, and EVE be modeled as RVs, denoted by Y1i, Y2i, and Y3i, respectively. Furthermore, in
channel use i, let the RVs modeling the AWGNs at the EHU, the ET, and the EVE be denoted by N1i,
N2i, and N3i, respectively, such that N1i ∼ N (0, σ21), N2i ∼ N (0, σ22), and N3i ∼ N (0, σ23), where
N (µ, σ2) denotes a Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2. Note that the derived results
can be extended to the complex-valued channel in a straightforward manner since the complex-valued
channel can be resolved in two parallel real-valued channels that use the achievability schemes that
we derive here. Moreover, let the RVs modeling the additive self-interferences at the EHU and the
ET in channel use i be denoted by I1i and I2i, respectively.
By using the notation defined above, the input-output relations describing the considered channel
in channel use i can be written as
Y1i = ViX2i + I1i +N1i, (1)
Y2i = ViX1i + I2i +N2i, (2)
Y3i = FiX1i +GiX2i +N3i. (3)
B. Self-Interference Model
A general model for the self-interference at the EHU and the ET is given by [28]
I1i =
M∑
m=1
Q˜1,m(i)X
m
1i , (4)
I2i =
M∑
m=1
Q˜2,m(i)X
m
2i , (5)
where M < ∞ is an integer and Q˜1,m(i) and Q˜2,m(i) model the m-th component of the self-
interference channel between the transmitter- and the receiver-ends at the EHU and the ET in channel
use i, respectively. As shown in [28], the components in (4) and (5) for which m is odd carry non-
negligible energy and the remaining components carry negligible energy and therefore can be ignored.
Furthermore, the higher order components carry less energy than the lower order terms. As a result,
6we can justifiably adopt the first-order approximation of the self-interference in (4) and (5), and model
I1i and I2i as
I1i = Q˜1iX1i, (6)
I2i = Q˜2iX2i, (7)
where Q˜1i = Q˜1(i) and Q˜2i = Q˜2(i) are used for simplicity of notation. Thereby, the adopted self-
interference model takes into account only the linear component of (4) and (5), i.e., the component
for m = 1. The linear self-interference model has been widely used, e.g. in [28], [29].
By inserting (6) and (7) into (1) and (2), respectively, we obtain
Y1i = ViX2i + Q˜1iX1i +N1i, (8)
Y2i = ViX1i + Q˜2iX2i +N2i. (9)
To model the worst-case of linear self-interference, we note the following. Since the ET knows
which symbol it has transmitted in channel use i, the ET knows the outcome of the RV X2i, denoted
by x2i. As a result of this knowledge, the noise that the ET “sees” in its received symbol Y2i given
by (9), is Q˜2ix2i + N2i, where x2i is a constant. Hence, the noise that the ET “sees”, Q˜2ix2i + N2i,
will represent the worst-case of noise, under a second moment constraint, if and only if Q˜2i is an
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian RV1. Therefore, in order to derive results for
the worst-case of linear self-interference, we assume that Q˜2i ∼ N{q¯2i, α2} in the rest of the paper.
Meanwhile, Q1i is distributed according to an arbitrary probability distribution with mean q¯1i and
variance α1.
Now, since Q˜1i and Q˜2i can be written equivalently as Q˜1i = Q1i+ q¯1 and Q˜2i = Q2i+ q¯2, where q¯1i
and q¯2i are the means of Q˜1i and Q˜2i, respectively, and Q1i and Q2i denote the remaining zero-mean
components of Q˜1i and Q˜2i, respectively, we can write Y1i and Y2i in (8) and (9), respectively, as
Y1i = ViX2i + q¯1iX1i +Q1iX1i +N1i, (10)
Y2i = ViX1i + q¯2iX2i +Q2iX2i +N2i. (11)
Since the ET always knows the outcome of X2i, x2i, and since given sufficient time it can always
estimate the deterministic component of its self-interference channel, q¯2, the ET can remove q¯2X2i
1This is due to the fact that the Gaussian distribution has the largest entropy under a second moment constraint, see [30].
7from its received symbol Y2i, given by (11), and thereby reduce its self-interference. In this way, the
ET obtains a new received symbol, denoted again by Y2i, as
Y2i = ViX1i +Q2iX2i +N2i. (12)
Note that, X2i travels from the transmitter-side to the receiver-side at the ET, it undergoes a random
transformation which is unknown to the ET. Thereby, since Q2i in (12) changes independently from
one channel use to the next, the ET cannot estimate and remove Q2iX2i from its received symbol
even though the ET knows the outcome of X2i. Thus, Q2iX2i in (12) is the residual self-interference
at the ET where the ET knows the outcome of X2i. On the other hand, since the EHU benefits from
the self-interference, it does not remove q¯1X1i from its received symbol Y1i, given by (10), in order
to have a self-interference signal with a much higher energy, which it can then harvest. Hence, the
received symbol at the EHU is given by (10).
In this paper, we are interested in the secrecy capacity of the channel characterised by the input-
output relationships given by (10), (12), and (3).
C. Energy Harvesting Model
The energy harvested by the EHU in channel use i is given by [27]
Ein,i = η(ViX2i + q¯1X1i +Q1iX1i)
2, (13)
where 0 < η < 1 is the energy harvesting efficiency coefficient. For convenience, we have assumed
unit time and thus we use the terms power and energy interchangeably in the sequel. The EHU stores
Ein,i in its battery, which is assumed to have an infinitely large storage capacity. Let Bi denote the
amount of harvested energy in the battery of the EHU at the end of the i-th channel use. Moreover,
let Eout,i be the extracted energy from the battery in the i-th channel use. Then, Bi, can be written as
Bi = Bi−1 + Ein,i − Eout,i. (14)
Since in channel use i the EHU cannot extract more energy than the amount of energy stored in its
battery at the end of channel use i− 1, the extracted energy from the battery in channel use i, Eout,i,
can be obtained as
Eout,i = min{Bi−1, X21i + Pp}, (15)
where X21i is the transmit energy of the desired transmit symbol in channel use i, X1i, and Pp is the
processing energy cost of the EHU [31]. The processing cost, Pp, models the system level power
8consumption at the EHU, i.e., the energy spent due to the electrical components in the electrical
circuit such as AC/DC convertors and RF amplifiers as well as the energy spent for processing. Note
that the ET also requires energy for processing. However, the ET is assumed to be equipped with
a conventional power source which is always capable of providing the processing energy without
affecting the energy required for transmission.
Now, if the total number of channel uses satisfies n → ∞, if the battery of the EHU has an
unlimited storage capacity, and furthermore
E{Ein,i} ≥ E{X21i}+ Pp (16)
holds, where E{·} denotes statistical expectation, then the number of channel uses in which the
extracted energy from the battery is insufficient and thereby Eout,i = Bi−1 holds is negligible compared
to the number of channel uses in which the extracted energy is sufficient for both transmission and
processing [32]. In other words, when the above three conditions hold, in almost all channel uses,
there will be enough energy to be extracted from the EHU’s battery for both processing, Pp, and for
the transmission of the desired transmit symbol X1i, X21i, and thereby Eout,i = X
2
1i + Pp holds.
III. UPPER BOUND ON THE SECRECY CAPACITY
For the considered channel, we propose the following theorem which establishes an upper bound
on the secrecy capacity.
Theorem 1: Assuming that the average power constraint at the ET is PET , an upper bound on the
secrecy capacity of the considered channel is given by
max
p(x1|x2,v),p(x2|v)
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V
I(X1;Y2|X2 = x2, V = v)p(x2|v)p(v)
−
∑
v∈V
∑
g∈G
∑
f∈F
I(X1;Y3|V = v,G = g, F = f)p(v)p(g)p(f)
Subject to
C1 :
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V
x22p(x2|v)p(v) ≤ PET
C2 :
∫
x1
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V
(x21 + Pp)p(x1|x2, v)p(x2|v)p(v)dx1 ≤∫
x1
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V
Einp(x1|x2, v)p(x2|v)p(v)dx1
C3 :
∑
x2∈X2
p(x2|v) = 1
9C4 :
∫
x1
p(x1|x2, v)dx1 = 1, (17)
where I(; |) denotes the conditional mutual information. In (17), lower-case letters x2, v, g, and f
represent realizations of the random variables X2, V , G, and F , respectively, and their support sets are
denoted by X2, V , G, and F , respectively. Constraint C1 in (17) constrains the average transmit power
of the ET to PET , and C2 is due to (16), i.e., due to the fact that EHU has to have harvested enough
energy for both processing and transmission of symbol X1. The maximum in the objective function
is taken over all possible conditional probability distributions of x1 and x2, given by p(x1|x2, v) and
p(x2|v), respectively.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A, where the converse is provided.
A. Simplified Expression of the Upper Bound on the Secrecy Capacity
The optimal input distributions at the EHU and the ET that are the solutions of the optimization
problem in (17) and the resulting simplified expressions of the upper bound on the secrecy capacity
are provided by the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The optimal input distribution at the EHU, found as the solution of the optimization prob-
lem in (17), is zero-mean Gaussian with variance PEHU(x2, v), i.e., p(x1|x2, v) ∼ N (0, PEHU(x2, v)),
where PEHU(x2, v) can be found as the solution of
v2
σ22 + x
2
2α2
+
(
1 +
v2PEHU(x2, v)
σ22 + x
2
2α2
)∑
f∈F
f 2
f 2PEHU(x2, v) + σ23
p(f)
=
(
1 +
v2PEHU(x2, v)
σ22 + x
2
2α2
)
λ2(1− η(g¯12 + α1)), (18)
where λ2 is chosen such that C2 in (17) holds with equality.
On the other hand, the optimal input distribution at the ET, found as the solution of the optimization
problem in (17), has the following discrete form
p(x2|v) = p(x2 = 0)δ(x2) + 1
2
J∑
j=1
p(x2 = x2j)
(
δ(x2 − x2j) + δ(x2 + x2j)
)
, (19)
where δ(·) denotes the Dirac delta function. Finally, the simplified expression of the upper bound on
the secrecy capacity in (17), denoted by Cus , is given by
Cus =
1
2
∑
v∈V
J∑
j=1
log
(
1 +
v2PEHU(x2, v)
σ22 + x
2
2jα2
)
p(x2 = x2j)p(v)
+
∑
v∈V
∑
g∈G
∑
f∈F
[∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2piσ2y3
J∑
j=1
p(x2 = x2j)e
− (y3−x2j)
2
2σ2y3
10
× ln
(
1√
2piσ2y3
J∑
j=1
p(x2 = x2j)e
− (y3−x2j)
2
2σ2y3
)
dy3 −
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2piσ23
J∑
j=1
p(x2 = x2j)e
− (z−x2j)
2
2σ23
× ln
(
1√
2piσ23
J∑
j=1
p(x2 = x2j)e
− (z−x2j)
2
2σ23
)
dz3
]
p(v)p(g)p(f). (20)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
IV. LOWER BOUND ON THE SECRECY CAPACITY - AN ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE
From Lemma 1, we can see that the upper bound on the secrecy capacity cannot be achieved since
the EHU has to know x22i in each channel use i, in order for the EHU to calculate (18). In other
words, the EHU can not adapt PEHU(x2, v) and the data rates of its codewords accordingly. The
knowledge of x22i at the EHU is not possible since the input distribution at the ET, given by (19), is
discrete with a finite number of probability mass points. However, if we set the input distribution at
the ET to be binary such that x2i, ∀i, takes values from the set {x0,−x0}, then the EHU can know
x22i in each channel use i since x
2
2i = x
2
0 , ∀i, and therefore this rate can be achieved. Hence, to obtain
an achievable lower bound on the secrecy capacity, we propose the ET to use the following input
distribution
p(x2|v) = 1
2
(
δ(x2 − x0(v)) + δ(x2 + x0(v))
)
. (21)
The value of x0(v) will be determined in the following.
A. Simplified Expression of the Lower Bound on the Secrecy Capacity
The simplified expression for the lower bound on the secrecy capacity resulting from the ET using
the distribution given by (21), is provided by the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Let us define I(x) as
I(x) = 2√
2pix
e−x
2/2
∫ ∞
0
e−y
2/2x cosh(y) ln(cosh(y))dy. (22)
Depending on the channel qualities, we have three cases for the achievable secrecy rate.
Case 1: If the following conditions hold
1
2
∑
v∈V
log
(
1 +
v2PEHU(x2, v)
σ22 + PETα2
)
p(v) + λ1PET
=λ2
(
(1− η(q¯12 + α1))
∑
v∈V
PEHU(x2, v)p(v)− ηPETΩV
)
, (23)
11
and
1
2
∑
v∈V
log
(
1 +
v2PEHU(x2, v)
σ22 + PETα2
)
p(v) >
∑
v∈V
∑
g∈G
∑
f∈F
[
1
2
ln
(
2pieσ2y3
)
+
PET
f 2PEHU(x2, v) + σ23
− I
( √
PET√
f 2PEHU(x2, v) + σ23
)
−1
2
ln
(
2pieσ23
)− PET
σ23
+ I
(√
PET
σ3
)]
p(v)p(g)p(f), (24)
where PEHU(x2, v) is the root of (18) for x2 =
√
PET and ΩV = E{v2}, then the input distribution
at the ET has the following form
p(x2|v) = 1
2
(
δ
(
x2 −
√
PET
)
+ δ
(
x2 +
√
PET
))
,∀v. (25)
On the other hand, the input distribution at the EHU is zero-mean Gaussian with variance PEHU(
√
PET , v),
i.e., p(x1|x2, v) ∼ N
(
0, PEHU(
√
PET , v)
)
, where PEHU(
√
PET , v) can be found as the solution of
(18) for x2 =
√
PET .
For Case 1, the achievable secrecy rate, denoted by C ls, is given by
C ls =
1
2
∑
v∈V
log
(
1 +
v2PEHU(
√
PET , v)
σ22 + PETα2
)
p(v)
+
∑
v∈V
∑
g∈G
∑
f∈F
[∫ ∞
−∞
1
2
√
2piσ2y3
(
e
− (y3−
√
PET )
2
2σ2y3 + e
− (y3+
√
PET )
2
2σ2y3
)
× ln
(
1
2
√
2piσ2y3
(
e
− (y3−
√
PET )
2
2σ2y3 + e
− (y3+
√
PET )
2
2σ2y3
))
dy3
−
∫ ∞
−∞
1
2
√
2piσ23
(
e
− (z3−
√
PET )
2
2σ23 + e
− (z3+
√
PET )
2
2σ23
)
× ln
(
e
− (z3−
√
PET )
2
2σ23 + e
− (z3+
√
PET )
2
2σ23
)
dz3
]
p(v)p(g)p(f). (26)
Case 2: If (23) does not hold, and
1
2
∑
v∈V
log
(
1 +
v2PEHU(x2, v)
σ22 + x
2
0(v)α2
)
p(v) >
∑
v∈V
∑
g∈G
∑
f∈F
[
1
2
ln
(
2pieσ2y3
)
+
x20(v)
f 2PEHU(x2, v) + σ23
− I
(
x0(v)√
f 2PEHU(x2, v) + σ23
)
−1
2
ln
(
2pieσ23
)− x20(v)
σ23
+ I
(
x0(v)
σ3
)]
p(v)p(g)p(f) (27)
12
holds, then the input distribution at the ET is given by
p(x2|v) = 1
2
(
δ(x2 − x0(v)) + δ(x2 + x0(v))
)
, (28)
whereas the input distribution at the EHU is zero-mean Gaussian with variance PEHU(x0(v), v). In
this case, PEHU(x0(v), v) and x0(v) are the roots of the system of equations comprised of (18) for
x2 = x0(v) and the following equation
1
2
log
(
1 +
v2PEHU(x0(v), v)
σ22 + x
2
0(v)α2
)
− λ1x20(v)
=λ2
(
(1− η(q¯12 + α1))PEHU(x0(v), v)− ηv2x20(v)
)
. (29)
For Case 2, the achievable secrecy rate is given by
C ls =
1
2
∑
v∈V
log
(
1 +
v2PEHU(x0(v), v)
σ22 + x
2
0(v)α2
)
p(v)
+
∑
v∈V
∑
g∈G
∑
f∈F
[∫ ∞
−∞
1
2
√
2piσ2y3
(
e
− (y3−x0(v))2
2σ2y3 + e
− (y3+x0(v))2
2σ2y3
)
× ln
(
1
2
√
2piσ2y3
(
e
− (y3−x0(v))2
2σ2y3 + e
− (y3+x0(v))2
2σ2y3
))
dy3
−
∫ ∞
−∞
1
2
√
2piσ23
(
e
− (z3−x0(v))2
2σ23 + e
− (z3+x0(v))2
2σ23
)
× ln
(
e
− (z3−x0(v))2
2σ23 + e
− (z3+x0(v))2
2σ23
)
dz3
]
p(v)p(g)p(f). (30)
Case 3: If neither (24) nor (27) holds, then, the achievable secrecy rate is C ls = 0.
Proof: In order for C1 in (17) to hold, or equivalently for C1 in (60) to hold, there are two
possible cases for x2. In Case 1, C1 in (60) is satisfied if x2 is set to take values from the set
{√PET ,−
√
PET}. If (63) for x22 = PET does not hold, then x2 is set to take values from the set
{x0(v),−x0(v)}, where x0(v) is given by (29) in order for C1 in (60) to be satisfied. Now, since
C ls =
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V I(X1;Y2|X2 = x2, V = v)p(x2|v)p(v)−
∑
v∈V
∑
g∈G
∑
f∈F I(X1;Y3|V = v,G =
g, F = f)p(v)p(g)p(f), where X1 follows a Gaussian probability distribution, and X2 is distributed
according to (25) and (28) for Case 1 and Case 2, respectively, we obtain the expressions in (26) and
(30) by using (60) and (78).
Lemma 2 gives insights into the achievability scheme of the derived lower bound on the secrecy
capacity. When Case 1 of Lemma 2 holds, the achievability scheme is very simple. In particular, the
ET only chooses between −√PET or
√
PET in every channel use. When Case 2 of Lemma 2 holds,
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from (29) we see that the ET adapts its transmit power to the channel fading states of the EHU-ET
channel, v, and increases its transmit power when v is larger, and conversely, it lowers its transmit
power when v is not as favourable. As for the EHU, we first note that, since the EHU knows the
square of the transmit symbol of the ET x2 in a given channel use, the EHU can adapt its transmit
power and its rate in the given channel use according to the expected self-interference at the ET,
which depends on the value of x22. Secondly, the EHU also takes advantage of the better channel
fading states of the EHU-ET channel, v, and increases its transmit power and rate when v is larger,
and conversely, it lowers its transmit power and rate when v is not as strong. Thirdly, since λ2 is
chosen such that constraint C2 in (17) holds, the transmit power of the EHU PEHU(x2, v) depends
on the processing cost Pp. Thereby, when Case 2 holds, the ET also takes into account the processing
cost of the EHU.
B. Achievability of the Lower Bound on the Secrecy Capacity
We set the total number of channel uses (i.e., symbols) n to n = k(N+B), where N+B denotes the
total number of time slots used for the transmission and k denotes the number of symbols transmitted
per time slot, where n→∞, k →∞, N →∞, and (N +B)→∞.
Let N denote a set comprised of the time slots during which the EHU has enough energy harvested
and thereby transmits a codeword, and let B denote a set comprised of the time slots during which
the EHU does not have enough energy harvested and thereby it is silent. Let N = |N | and B = |B|,
where | · | denotes the cardinality of a set.
Transmissions at the ET: During the k channel uses of a considered time slot with fading realisation
v, the ET’s transmit symbol is drawn from the probability distribution given in Lemma 2. Thus, in each
channel use of the considered time slot, the ET transmits either
√
PET or −
√
PET with probability
1/2 if Case 1 in Lemma 2 holds, or transmits x0(v) or −x0(v) with probability 1/2 if Case 2 in
Lemma 2 holds.
Reception of Energy and Transmission of Information at the EHU: The EHU first generates all
binary sequences of length kNREHU , where
REHU =
1
2
∑
v∈V
log
(
1 +
v2PEHU(x2, v)
σ22 + x
2
2α2
)
p(v), (31)
where PEHU(x2, v) and x2 can be found from Lemma 2 depending on which case holds. Then the
EHU uniformly assigns each generated sequence to one of 2kNRs groups, where Rs is given by (26)
for Case 1 of Lemma 2, or by (30) for Case 2 of Lemma 2. The confidential message W drawn
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uniformly from the set W ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2kNRs} is then assigned to a group. Next, the EHU randomly
select a binary sequence from the corresponding group to which W is assigned, according to the
uniform distribution. This binary sequence is then mapped to a codeword comprised of kN symbols,
which is to be transmitted in N +B time slots. The symbols of the codeword are drawn according to
a zero-mean, unit-variance Gaussian distribution. Next, the codeword is divided into N blocks, where
each block is comprised of k symbols. The length of each block is assumed to coincide with a single
fading realization, and thereby to a single time slot.
The EHU will transmit in a given time slot only when it has harvested enough energy both for
processing and transmission in the given time slot, i.e., only when its harvested energy accumulates to
a level which is higher than Pp +PEHU(x2, v), where v is the fading gain in the time slot considered
for transmission. Otherwise, the EHU is silent and only harvests energy. When the EHU transmits,
it transmits the next untransmitted block of k symbols of its codeword. To this end, each symbol of
this block is first multiplied by
√
PEHU(x2, v), where PEHU(x2, v) can be found from Lemma 2, and
then the block of k symbols is transmitted over the wireless channel to the ET. The EHU repeats this
procedure until it transmits all N blocks of its entire codeword for which it needs N +B time slots.
Receptions at the ET: When the ET receives a transmitted block by the EHU, it checks if the power
level of the received block is higher than the noise level at the ET or not. If affirmative, the ET places
the received block in its data storage, without decoding. Otherwise the received block is discarded.
Now, in N +B time slots, the ET receives the entire codeword transmitted by the EHU. In order
for the ET to be able to decode the transmitted codeword, the rate of the transmitted codeword must
be equal to or lower than the capacity of the EHU-ET’s channel, given by
CEHU−ET =
1
2
∑
v∈V
log
(
1 +
v2PEHU(x2, v)
σ22 + x
2
2α2
)
p(v). (32)
Note that the rate of the transmitted codeword is REHU , given by (31). Now, since REHU =
CEHU−ET , the ET is able to decode the codeword transmitted by the EHU, by using a joint topicality
decoder. Next, since the ET knows the binary sequences corresponding to each group, by decoding
the transmitted codeword the ET determines the group to which the transmitted codeword belongs
to. As a result, the ET is able to decode the secret message W .
In the N +B time slots, the achieved secrecy rate is given by lim(N+B)→∞ kNk(N+B)Rs
= lim(N+B)→∞ NN+BRs. It was proven in [32] that when the EHU is equipped with a battery with
an unlimited storage capacity and when C2 in (17) holds, then N/(N + B)→ 1 as (N + B)→∞.
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Thereby, the achieved secrecy rate in N +B time slots is given by lim(N+B)→∞ NN+BRs = Rs, which
is the actual lower bound of the channel secrecy capacity given by Lemma 2.
Receptions at the EVE: EVE receives the transmitted blocks by the EHU and the ET. Similarly to
the ET, EVE places the received block in its data storage, without decoding.
In N + B time slots, the EVE also receives the entire codeword transmitted by the EHU. In
addition, EVE receives the signal from the ET, comprised of randomly generated symbols (see Lemma
2), which acts as noise to EVE and impairs the ability of EVE to decode the codeword from the
EHU. To show that the EVE will not be able to decode the secret message, we use properties of
the multiple access channel, resulting from the EHU and the ET transmitting at the same time. The
multiple-access capacity region at the EVE formed by the transmission of the EHU and the ET is
given by I(X1, X2;Y3|V,G, F ). The EVE will be able to decode the EHU’s codeword only if one of
the following two cases holds, i.e., REHU ≤ I(X1, Y2|X2, V,G, F ) when RET ≤ I(X2;Y3|V,G, F )
or REHU ≤ I(X1, Y2|V,G, F ) when RET ≤ I(X2;Y3|X1, V,G, F ), where RET is the entropy of the
signal generated by the ET and is given by
RET = −
[
p(x2) log2 p(x2) + p(x2) log2 p(x2)
]
. (33)
In (33), p(x2) = 1/2, see Lemma 2. As a result,
RET = log 2 = 1. (34)
Case 1: For the EHU’s codeword to be decodable at the EVE in this case,
REHU ≤ I(X1, Y2|X2, V,G, F ) and RET ≤ I(X2;Y3|V,G, F ) have to hold. For I(X2;Y3|V,G, F )
we have
I(X2;Y3|V, F,G) =
∑
v∈V
∑
g∈G
∑
f∈F
[∫ ∞
−∞
1
2
√
2piσ2y3
(
e
− (y3−x2)2
2σ2y3 + e
− (y3+x2)2
2σ2y3
)
× ln
(
1
2
√
2piσ2y3
(
e
− (y3−x2)2
2σ2y3 + e
− (y3+x2)2
2σ2y3
))
dy3
−
∫ ∞
−∞
1
2
√
2piσ2y3
e
− (z3−x2)2
2σ2y3 × ln e−
(z3−x2)2
2σy3
2
dz3
]
p(v)p(g)p(f), (35)
where x2 is drawn from (25) or (28), depending on which case in Lemma 2 holds. According to [33],
we can rewrite (35) as
I(X2;Y3|V, F,G) =
∑
v∈V
∑
g∈G
∑
f∈F
[
1
2
ln
(
2pieσ2y3
)
+
x22
f 2PEHU(x2, v) + σ23
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− I
(
x2√
f 2PEHU(x2, v) + σ23
)
− 1
2
ln
(
2pieσ2y3
)]
p(v)p(g)p(f), (36)
where I(x) is defined in (22). Thereby,
I(X2;Y3|V, F,G)
=
∑
v∈V
∑
g∈G
∑
f∈F
[
x22
f 2PEHU(x2, v) + σ23
−I
(
x2√
f 2PEHU(x2, v) + σ23
)]
p(v)p(g)p(f). (37)
The maximum value of the term x
2
2
f2PEHU (x2,v)+σ
2
3
−I
(
x2√
f2PEHU (x2,v)+σ
2
3
)
in (37), for any v, f, and
g is one [33]. Thereby, in order for RET = I(X2;Y3|V, F,G) = 1 to hold, in which case the EVE
would decode the secret message, then x
2
2
f2PEHU (x2,v)+σ
2
3
−I
(
x2√
f2PEHU (x2,v)+σ
2
3
)
has to be equal to one
for all fading realizations v, f, g. However, since the fading realizations are outcomes of continuous
RVs, the probability of that happening is zero. Thereby, I(X2;Y3|V, F,G) is less than 1 and as a
result RET > I(X2;Y3|V, F,G). Consequently, Case 1 can not hold.
Case 2: For the EHU’s codeword to be decodable at the EVE, then REHU ≤ I(X1, Y2|V,G, F )
and RET ≤ I(X2;Y3|X1, V,G, F ) have to hold. For I(X1;Y3|V, F,G) we have
I(X1;Y3|V, F,G) =
∑
v∈V
∑
g∈G
∑
f∈F
[∫ ∞
−∞
1
2
√
2piσ2y3
(
e
− (y3−x2)2
2σ2y3 + e
− (y3+x2)2
2σ2y3
)
× ln
(
1
2
√
2piσ2y3
(
e
− (y3−x2)2
2σ2y3 + e
− (y3+x2)2
2σ2y3
))
dy3
−
∫ ∞
−∞
1
2
√
2piσ23
(
e
− (z3−x2)2
2σ23 + e
− (z3+x2)2
2σ23
)
× ln
(
e
− (z3−x2)2
2σ23 + e
− (z3+x2)2
2σ23
)
dz3
]
p(v)p(g)p(f),
(38)
where x2 is drawn from (25) or (28), depending on which case in Lemma 2 holds. We can rewrite
(38) as
I(X1;Y3|V, F,G) =
∑
v∈V
∑
g∈G
∑
f∈F
[
1
2
ln
(
2pieσ2y3
)
+
x22
f 2PEHU(x2, v) + σ23
−I
(
x2√
f 2PEHU(x2, v) + σ23
)
− 1
2
ln
(
2pieσ23
) −x22
σ23
+ I
(
x2
σ3
)]
p(v)p(g)p(f), (39)
where I(x) is defined in (22). By rearranging the elements in (39), we can write
I(X1;Y3|V, F,G) =
∑
v∈V
∑
g∈G
∑
f∈F
[
1
2
ln
(
1 +
f 2PEHU(x2, v)
σ23
)
−Ψ
]
p(v)p(g)p(f). (40)
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In (40), Ψ = x
2
2
σ23
− I
(
x2
σ3
)
− x22
f2PEHU (x2,v)+σ
2
3
+ I
(
x2√
f2PEHU (x2,v)+σ
2
3
)
. Now, we can lower bound
REHU as
REHU =
1
2
∑
v∈V
log
(
1 +
v2PEHU(x2, v)
σ22 + x
2
2α2
)
p(v)
>
∑
v∈V
∑
g∈G
∑
f∈F
[
1
2
ln
(
2pieσ2y3
)
+
x22
f 2PEHU(x2, v) + σ23
− I
(
x2√
f 2PEHU(x2, v) + σ23
)
−1
2
ln
(
2pieσ23
)− x22
σ23
+ I
(
x2
σ3
)]
p(v)p(g)p(f)
=
∑
v∈V
∑
g∈G
∑
f∈F
[
1
2
ln
(
1 +
f 2PEHU(x2, v)
σ23
)
−Ψ
]
p(v)p(g)p(f) = I(X1, Y2|V,G, F ). (41)
Thereby, REHU > I(X1, Y2|V,G, F ). As a result, Case 2 can not hold either.
As Case 1 and Case 2 show, the EHU’s codeword is outside the multiple-access capacity region at
the EVE, and thereby the EVE will not be able to decode the EHU’s secret message.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we illustrate numerical examples of the upper bound on the secrecy capacity as
well as the derived achievable secrecy rate, and compare it with the achievable secrecy rates of a
chosen benchmark scheme. To this end, we first outline the system parameters, then we introduce the
benchmark scheme, and finally we provide the numerical results.
A. System Parameters
We use the standard path loss model given by
Ωj =
(
c
fc4pi
)2
d−γ, j ∈ {V, F,G} (42)
in order to compute the average power of the channel fading gains, V , F , and G, where c denotes
the speed of light, fc is the carrier frequency, d is the length of the considered link (i.e., the length
of the EHU-ET link for ΩV , the length of the EHU-EVE link for ΩF , and the length of the ET-E
link for ΩG), and γ is the path loss exponent. We assume that γ = 3. For the carrier frequency,
we adopt a value which is commonly associated with low power networks, and we set fc = 2.4
GHz. In addition, we assume a bandwidth of B = 100 kHz. To account for the energy losses during
the energy harvesting process, the energy harvesting efficiency coefficient η is assumed to be equal
to 0.8. Throughout this section, we assume Rayleigh fading with average power ΩV , ΩF , and ΩG,
respectively, given by (42). To provide practical results, we chose an achievable value for the self-
interference suppression factor, and we set α2 to −100 dB. As a result, the ET needs to suppress
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100 dB of the self-interference, which is possible in practice [24]. As the EHU does not suppress
the self-interference, we chose higher values for the self-interference amplification factor at the EHU
and we set α1 to −40 dB and q1 to 0 dB. The noise power to −90 dBm.
B. Benchmark Scheme
Since to the best of the authors’ knowledge there are no available communication schemes in the
literature for the considered FD system model, we use the HD counterpart as a benchmark scheme,
which is outlined in the following.
Time is divided into time slots with duration T . A single time slot coincides with one fading
realization. A portion of each time slot, denoted by T − t, is used for energy transmission by the
ET and for energy harvesting by the EHU and the rest of the time slot, t, is used for information
transmission by the EHU, during which the ET is silent. Hence the EHU and the ET both operate in
the HD mode. The EHU and the ET are assumed to have full CSI of the EHU-ET channel. Since in
this case the ET stops transmitting during the information transmission by the EHU, an interference
signal is not present at the EVE. The secrecy rate is thus given by
Rs = max
(
0,max
t
t
(
1
2
∑
v∈V
log
(
1 +
v2PEHU(v)
σ21
)
p(v)
−
∑
v∈V
∑
f∈F
log
(
1 +
f 2PEHU(v)
σ23
)
p(v)p(f)
))
, (43)
where PEHU(v) can be found as the root of the following equation
v2
σ21
−
(
1 +
v2PEHU(v)
σ21
)∑
f∈F
f 2
f 2PEHU(v) + σ23
p(f) =
(
1 +
v2PEHU(v)
σ21
)
λ2 (44)
and λ2 is chosen such that
t
(∑
v∈V
PEHU(v)p(v) + Pp
)
= (T − t)ηPETΩV (45)
holds.
C. Numerical Examples
The upper and lower bounds on the secrecy capacity are illustrated on Fig. 1, and are evaluated
against the benchmark scheme. From Fig. 1 we notice that the FD scheme outperforms the HD scheme,
which is a result of two factors. Firstly, energy recycling is impossible when the EHU operates as
an HD node. Secondly, in HD, the ET stops acting like a jammer and an interference signal is not
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Fig. 1. Upper and lower bounds on the secrecy capacity. Fig. 1a corresponds to the case when the ET is closer to the EHU than the
EVE, i.e., dEHU−ET = 10m and dEHU−EV E = 12m, whilst Fig. 1b corresponds to the case when the EVE is closer to the EHU
than the ET, i.e., dEHU−ET = 10m and dEHU−EV E = 9m.
present at the EVE. Note that since physical layer security relies on the channel quality between the
nodes in the network, distance plays a crucial role. To demonstrate this, we consider different cases
for the distances between the nodes. In the case when the ET is closer to the EHU than the EVE,
the EHU-ET channel is better, on average, than the EHU-EVE channel. For this case, the secrecy
rate of the HD benchmark scheme is non-zero, but it is smaller than the derived achievable secrecy
rate of the FD scheme, as it can be seen in Fig. 1a. When the EVE is closer to the EHU than the
ET, the EHU-ET channel is worse, on average, than the EHU-EVE channel. In this case the secrecy
rate of the HD benchmark scheme is zero, whereas the derived FD secrecy rate is positive, see Fig.
1b. Thereby, as a result of the interference signal generated by the ET, in these cases the proposed
FD scheme offers positive secrecy rates even when the EVE is closer to the EHU than the legitimate
receiver, which is impossible to achieve by employing the HD scheme. As our numerical results show,
the difference between the upper bound on the secrecy capacity and the achievable rate is smaller than
1 dB. Thereby, the derived upper bound is tight in the sense that it shows that the secrecy capacity
and the achievable rate differ only 1 dB, which for practical purposes is not a large gap.
In Figs. 2- 3, we show the impact of the self-recycled energy on the achieved secrecy rates. In
particular, we show the ratio between the FD secrecy rate and the HD secrecy rate as a function of
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Fig. 2. FD secrecy rate / HD secrecy rate ratio as a function of the self-interference at the EHU. Fig. 2 corresponds to the case when
the ET is closer to the EHU than the EVE, i.e., dEHU−ET = 10m and dEHU−EV E = 12m.
the self-interference at the EHU, given by q21 + α1. As the self-interference at the EHU increases,
so does the FD secrecy rate. Meanwhile, the HD secrecy rate is constant, as the HD mode does not
result in self-interference. Thereby, higher self-interference at the EHU leads to higher secrecy rate.
The secrecy rates are also illustrated on Fig. 3, for different values of the energy harvesting efficiency
coefficient η. As the energy harvesting efficiency coefficient represents the amount of energy that is
converted from harvested to operational energy (i.e., energy used for transmission and processing),
lower values for η yield lower secrecy rates, both for FD and HD. However, the FD scheme again
outperforms the HD scheme as a result of the previously discussed factors.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the secrecy capacity of a FD wirelessly powered communication
system consisting of an EHU and an ET in the presence of a passive EVE. We have shown that the
ET’s transmit signal can act as interference against the EVE. We have derived an upper bound on the
secrecy capacity and, furthermore, an achievable secrecy rate that can be achieved with relative low
complexity. It has been shown that the proposed scheme achieves higher secrecy rates compared to
the conventional HD-based schemes, even in the case when the channel between the EHU and the
ET is worse, on average, than the channel between the EHU and EVE. In future works, it would be
interesting to consider an arbitrary number of EHUs and EVEs in the network.
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Fig. 3. Upper and lower bounds on the secrecy capacity, for different values of the energy harvesting efficiency coefficient η. Fig. 3
corresponds to the case when the ET is closer to the EHU than the EVE, i.e., dEHU−ET = 10m and dEHU−EV E = 12m.
APPENDIX A
CONVERSE
In order for us to claim that the result in (17) is indeed an upper bound on the secrecy capacity of
the considered channel, we provide the following converse.
Let W be the confidential message that the EHU wants to transmit to the ET and which EVE wants
to intercept. Let this message be uniformly selected at random from the message set {1, 2, ..., 2nRs},
where n → ∞ is the number of channel uses that will be used for transmitting W from the EHU
to the ET, and Rs denotes the data rate of message W . We assume a priori knowledge of the CSI
of the EHU-ET channel, i.e., Vi is known for i = 1....n before the start of the communication at all
three nodes. In addition, the EHU-EVE and the ET-EVE channels, given by Gi and Fi, respectively,
are only known by EVE for i = 1....n.
We have the following limits for the mutual information between the EHU and EVE
I(W ;Y n3 |V n, Gn, F n) = H(W |V n, Gn, F n)−H(W |Y n3 , V n, Gn, F n)
(a)
≤ H(W |V n)−H(W |Y n3 , V n, Gn, F n) ≤ n, (46)
where (a) follows since conditioning reduces entropy and  is a positive number. On the other hand,
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we have the following limit due to Fano’s inequality [30]
H(W |Y n2 , V n) ≤ PenRs + 1, (47)
where Pe is the average probability of error of the message W and Rs is the secrecy rate.
Now, for the secrecy rate, Rs, we have the following limit
nRs ≤ H(W |V n)
(a)
≤ H(W |Y n3 , V n, Gn, F n) + n = H(W |Y n3 , V n, Gn, F n) + n
+H(W |V n)−H(W |V n) +H(W |V n, Y n2 , Xn2 )−H(W |V n, Y n2 , Xn2 )
(b)
≤ H(W |Y n3 , V n, Gn, F n) + n
+H(W |V n)−H(W |V n, Gn, F n) +H(W |V n, Y n2 , Xn2 )−H(W |V n, Y n2 , Xn2 )
(c)
= I(W ;Y n2 , X
n
2 |V n)− I(W ;Y n3 |V n, Gn, F n) +H(W |V n, Y n2 , Xn2 ) + n
(d)
≤ I(W ;Y n2 , Xn2 |V n)− I(W ;Y n3 |V n, Gn, F n) +H(W |V n, Y n2 ) + n
(e)
≤ I(W ;Y n2 , Xn2 |V n)− I(W ;Y n3 |V n, Gn, F n) + PenRs + 1 + n (48)
where (a) follows from (46), (b) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy, (c) is obtained
by exploiting I(W ;Y n2 , X
n
2 |V n) = H(W |V n) − H(W |V n, Y n2 , Xn2 ) and I(W ;Y n3 |V n, Gn, F n) =
H(W |V n, Gn, F n) −H(W |Y n3 , V n, Gn, F n), (d) results from the fact that conditioning reduces en-
tropy, and (e) follows by Fano’s inequality given by (47). Dividing both sides of (48) by n, we
have
Rs ≤ 1
n
I(W ;Y n2 , X
n
2 |V n)−
1
n
I(W ;Y n3 |V n, Gn, F n) + PeRs +
1
n
+ . (49)
Assuming that Pe → 0 and → 0 as n→∞, which means that we assume a zero-error probability
at the ET and zero mutual information between the EHU and EVE, (49) for n→∞ can be written
as
Rs ≤ 1
n
I(W ;Y n2 , X
n
2 |V n)−
1
n
I(W ;Y n3 |V n, Gn, F n). (50)
We represent the first element of the right hand side of (50) as
I(W ;Y n2 , X
n
2 |V n) = I(W ;Y n2 |Xn2 , V n) + I(W ;Xn2 |V n). (51)
Now, since the transmitted message W is uniformly drawn from the message set at the EHU and
since the ET does not know which message the EHU transmits, the following holds
I(W ;Xn2 |V n) = 0. (52)
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Inserting (52) into (51), we have
I(W ;Y n2 , X
n
2 |V n) = I(W ;Y n2 |Xn2 , V n). (53)
Inserting (53) into (50), we have
Rs ≤ 1
n
I(W ;Y n2 |Xn2 , V n)−
1
n
I(W ;Y n3 |V n, Gn, F n)
(a)
≤
n∑
i=1
(
I(W ;Y2i|Y i−12 , Xn2 , V n)− I(W ;Y3i|Y i−13 , V n, Gn, F n)
)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
H(Y2i|Y i−12 , Xn2 , V n)−H(Y2i|Y i−12 , Xn2 , V n,W )
−H(Y3i|Y i−13 V n, Gn, F n) +H(Y3i|Y i−13 , V n, Gn, F n,W )
)
(b)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(
H(Y2i|Y i−12 , Xn2 , V n)−H(Y2i|Y i−12 , Xn2 , V n,W,X1i)
−H(Y3i|Y i−13 , V n, Gn, F n) +H(Y3i|Y i−13 , V n, Gn, F n,W )
)
. (54)
where (a) follows from the fact that the entropy between a collection of random variables is less than
or equal to the sum of their individual entropies and (b) results from the fact that conditioning reduces
entropy. On the other hand, because of the memoryless channel assumption, Y3i is independent of
Y i−13 , therefore, we can write
H(Y3i|Y i−13 , V n, Gn, F n,W ) = H(Y3i|V n, Gn, F n,W )
(a)
= H(Y3i, V
n, Gn, F n,W )−H(V n, Gn, F n,W )
(b)
≤ H(Y3i, V n, Gn, F n,W,Xn1 )−H(V n, Gn, F n,W )
(c)
= H(Y3i|V n, Gn, F n,W,Xn1 ) +H(V n, Gn, F n,W,Xn1 )−H(V n, Gn, F n,W )
(d)
= H(Y3i|V n, Gn, F n,W,Xn1 ) +H(Xn1 |V n, Gn, F n,W ) +H(V n, Gn, F n,W )−H(V n, Gn, F n,W )
= H(Y3i|V n, Gn, F n,W,Xn1 ) +H(Xn1 |V n, Gn, F n,W )
(e)
= H(Y3i|V n, Gn, F n,W,Xn1 )
(f)
≤ H(Y3i|V n, Gn, F n, Xn1 ), (55)
where (a) follows from the chain rule for joint entropy, (b) follows from the properties of joint
entropy, (c) and (d) follow from the chain rule for joint entropy, (e) follows from the fact that
H(Xn1 |W,V n, Gn, F n) = 0 because of the deterministic mapping W → Xn1 , and (f) follows from
the fact that conditioning reduces entropy.
By inserting (55) into (54), we obtain
Rs ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(
H(Y2i|Y i−12 , Xn2 , V n)−H(Y2i|Y i−12 , Xn2 , V n, X1i,W )
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−H(Y3i|Y i−13 , V n, Gn, F n) +H(Y3i|V n, Gn, F n, Xn1 )
)
(a)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
H(Y2i|X2i, Vi)−H(Y2i|X2i, Vi, X1i,W )− (H(Y3i|Vi, Gi, Fi)−H(Y3i|Vi, Gi, Fi, X1i))
)
(b)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
H(Y2i|X2i, Vi)−H(Y2i|X2i, Vi, X1i)− (H(Y3i|Vi, Gi, Fi)−H(Y3i|Vi, Gi, Fi, X1i))
)
(56)
where (a) follows from the fact that due to the memoryless channel assumption, Y2i is independent
of all elements in the vectors Xn2 , V
n, and Xn1 except the elements X2i, Vi, and X1i, respectively,
and of Y i−12 , and thereby H(Y2i|Y i−12 , Xn2 , V n) = H(Y2i|X2i, Vi), and
H(Y2i|Y i−12 , Xn2 , V n, X1i,W ) = H(Y2i|X2i, Vi, X1i,W ). Similarly, Y3i is independent of all the ele-
ments of the vector Xn1 except X1i, of all the elements of the vector V
n except Vi, of all the elements
of the vector Gn except Gi, of all the elements of the vector F n except Fi and of Y i−13 , and thereby
H(Y3i|Y i−13 , V n, Gn, F n) = H(Y3i|Vi, Gi, Fi) and H(Y3i|V n, Gn, F n, Xn1 ) = H(Y3i|Vi, Gi, Fi, X1i). In
continuation, (b) follows from the fact that given X2i, Vi, and X1i, Y2i is conditionally independent of
the message W as it can be seen from (12), and thereby H(Y2i|X2i, Vi, X1i,W ) = H(Y2i|X2i, Vi, X1i).
Now, we can write (56) as
Rs ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(
I(X1i;Y2i|X2i, Vi)− I(X1i;Y3i|Vi, Gi, Fi)
)
= I(X1;Y2|X2, V )− I(X1;Y3|V,G, F ).
(57)
Therefore, an upper bound on the secrecy capacity is given by (57) when no additional constraints
on X1 and X2 exist and it is achieved by maximizing over all possible probability distributions
p(x1, x2|v), or equivalently by {p(x1|x2, v), p(x2|v)}. In our case, we impose a further constraint on
X2 which limits the ET’s average output power to PET , which is expressed by C1 in (17). Moreover,
the second constraint, expressed by C2 in (17), concerns X1 and it limits the average transmit power
of the EHU to be less than the maximum average harvested power minus the processing cost Pp.
Constraints C3 and C4 in (17) come from the definitions of probability distributions. Hence, the
capacity is upper bounded by (17). This proves the converse.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Since the EHU-ET channel is an AWGN channel with channel gain v and AWGN with variance
σ22 + x
2
2α2, I(X1;Y2|X2 = x2, V = v) = 12 log
(
1 + v
2PEHU (x2,v)
σ22+x
2
2α2
)
. In addition, since Q1 and X1 are
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zero-mean Gaussian RVs, the left-hand side of constraint C2 in (17) can be transformed into∫
x1
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V
(x21 + Pp)p(x1|x2, v)p(x2|v)p(v)dx1 =
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V
PEHU(x2, v)p(x2|v)p(v) + Pp. (58)
where we have used
∫
x1
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V x
2
1p(x1|x2, v)p(x2|v)p(v)dx1
=
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V PEHU(x2, v)p(x2|v)p(v). Whereas, the right-hand side of C2 in (17) can be rewritten
as ∫
x1
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V
Einp(x1|x2, v)p(x2|v)p(v)dx1
=
∫
q1
∫
x1
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V
η(ex2 + q¯1x1 + q1x1)
2p(x1|x2, v)p(x2|v)p(v)p(q1)dx1dq1
=
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V
ηv2x22p(x2|v)p(v) +
∫
x1
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V
ηq¯21x
2
1p(x1|x2, v)p(x2|v)p(v)dx1
+
∫
q1
∫
x1
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V
ηq21x
2
1p(x1|x2, v)p(x2|v)p(v)p(g1)dx1dg1
=
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V
ηe2x22p(x2|v)p(v) + ηq¯21
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V
PEHU(x2, v)p(x2|v)p(v)
+ ηα1
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V
PEHU(x2, v)p(x2|v)p(v), (59)
where q1 represents the realizations of the random variable Q1. Combining (58) and (59) transforms
(17) into
max
PEHU (x2,v),p(x2|v)
∑
x2∈X∈
∑
v∈V
1
2
log
(
1 +
v2PEHU(x2, v)
σ22 + x
2
2α2
)
p(x2|v)p(v)
−
∑
v∈V
∑
g∈G
∑
f∈F
I(X1;Y3|V = v,G = g, F = f)p(v)p(g)p(f)
Subject to
C1 :
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V
x22p(x2|v)p(v) ≤ PET
C2 :
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V
PEHU(x2, v)p(x2|v)p(v) + Pp ≤
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V
ηv2x22p(x2|v)p(v)
+ η(q¯1
2 + α1)
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V
PEHU(x2, v)p(x2|v)p(v)
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C3 :
∑
x2∈X2
p(x2|v) = 1
. C4 :PEHU(x2, v) ≥ 0. (60)
Now, since the log function and the mutual information are both concave functions [34] with respect
to the optimization variables, their difference, as given in the objective function of (60) is in general
neither concave nor convex. Therefore, the optimization problem in (60) may not be convex so a given
solution can either be a local maximum or a global maximum. However, since we are interested in
finding an upper bound on the secrecy capacity, we can still apply the Lagrange duality method due
to the fact that the dual function of a maximization optimization problem yields an upper bound on
the optimal solution, see [35]. Thereby, we write the Lagrangian of (60) as
L =
∑
x2∈X∈
∑
v∈V
1
2
log
(
1 +
v2PEHU(x2, v)
σ22 + x
2
2α2
)
p(x2|v)p(v)
−
∑
v∈V
∑
g∈G
∑
f∈F
I(X1;Y3|V = v,G = g, F = f)p(v)p(g)p(f)
− λ1
(∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V
x22p(x2|v)p(v)− PET
)
− λ2
(
(1− η(q¯12 + α1))
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V
PEHU(x2, v)p(x2|v)p(v)
+Pp −
∑
x2∈X2
∑
v∈V
ηv2x22p(x2|v)p(v)
)
− µ1
( ∑
x2∈X∈
p(x2|v)− 1
)
− µ2PEHU .
(61)
In (60), we assume that 0 < η(g¯12 + α1) < 1, since η(g¯12 + α1) ≥ 1 would practically imply that
the EHU recycles the same or even a larger amount of energy than what has been transmitted by
the EHU, which is not possible in reality. In (61), λ1, λ2, µ1, and µ2 are the Lagrangian multipliers
associated with C1, C2, C3, and C4 in (17), respectively. Differentiating (61) with respect to the
optimization variables, we obtain
∂L
∂PEHU(x2, v)
=
v2
σ22+x
2
2α2
1 + v
2PEHU (x2,v)
σ22+x
2
2α2
− λ2(1− η(g¯12 + α1))− µ2
− ∂
∂PEHU(x2, v)
(∑
g∈G
∑
f∈F
I(X1;Y3|V = v,G = g, F = f)p(g)p(f)
)
= 0, (62)
∂L
∂p(x2|v) =
1
2
∑
v∈V
log
(
1 +
v2PEHU(x2, v)
σ22 + x
2
2α2
)
p(v)− λ1
∑
v∈V
x22p(v)− µ1
− ∂
∂p (x2|v)
(∑
v∈V
∑
g∈G
∑
f∈F
I(X1;Y3|V = v,G = g, F = f)p(v)p(g)p(f)
)
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− λ2
(
(1− η(q¯12 + α1))
∑
v∈V
PEHU(x2, v)p(v)− η
∑
v∈V
v2x22p(v)
)
= 0. (63)
Now, when PEHU > 0, then µ2 = 0 in (62). In consequence, we can use (62) to find PEHU(x2, v)
as given by Theorem 2. If the solution is negative, then PEHU(x2, v) = 0.
By using (63), we can prove that the optimal input probability distribution, p(x2|v), is discrete.
The proof is based on ([36]), where the authors derive a methodology which identifies the capacity-
achieving distribution, based on standard decompositions in Hilbert space with the Hermitian poly-
nomials as a basis. Since
I(X1;Y3|V = v,G = g, F = f) = H(Y3|E = e,G = g, F = f)
−H(Y3|X1 = x1, V = v,G = g, F = f) = I(X1;Y3|V = v,G = g, F = f)
= H(Y3|V = v,G = g, F = f)−H(Z3|V = v,G = g, F = f), (64)
where Z3 = GX2 +N3, first we note that
I ′(X1;Y3|V = v,G = g, F = f)
= H ′(Y3|V = v,G = g, F = f)−H ′(Z3|V = v,G = g, F = f)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2piσz3
e
− (z3−x2)2
2σ2z3 × ln (p(z3)) dz3 −
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2piσy3
e
− (y3−x2)2
2σ2y3 × log (p(y3)) dy3. (65)
where ′ denotes the derivative with respect to p(x2|v). Now, we decompose the integrals in (65) by
using Hermitian polynomials. To this end, we define
log(p(y3)) =
∞∑
m=0
c(1)m Hm(y3) and log(p(z3)) =
∞∑
m=0
c(2)m Hm(z3), (66)
where c(1)m and c
(2)
m are constants and Hm(y3) and Hm(z3) are the Hermitian polynomials, ∀m. When
(66) is used in conjunction with the generating function of the Hermitian polynomials, given by
e−
t2
2
+tx =
∞∑
m=0
Hm(x)
tm
m!
, (67)
for H ′(Y3|E = e,G = g, F = f) in (65) we obtain
H ′(Y3|E = e,G = g, F = f) = −
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2pi
e
− (y3−x2)2
2σ2y3
∞∑
m=0
c(1)m Hm(y3)dy3
= −
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
y23
2 e−
x22
2
+x2y3
∞∑
m=0
c(1)m Hm(y3)dy3
= −
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
y23
2
∞∑
n=0
Hn(x)
tn
n!
∞∑
m=0
c(1)m Hm(y3)dy3 = −
∞∑
m=0
c(1)m x
m
2 . (68)
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In (68), we used the ortogonality of the Hermitian polynomials with respect to the weight function
e−
y23
2 and we set σ2y3 = 1 for simplicity. By following an analogous procedure for H
′(Z3|E = e,G =
g, F = f) in (65), we obtain
H ′(Z3|V = v,G = g, F = f) = −
∞∑
m=0
c(2)m x
m
2 . (69)
In order to identify the constants c(1)m and c
(2)
m in (66), we consider 2 scenarios.
Case 1: Let us assume PEHU(x2, v) = 0. The condition given by (63) can be written as
∞∑
m=0
(c(1)m − c(2)m )xm2 = λ1x22 + µ1 + λ2
(
(1− η(q¯12 + α1))PEHU − ηe2x22
)
. (70)
The comparison of the exponents of x2 in (70) yields
c
(1)
0 = µ1, c
(2)
0 = 0; c
(1)
1 = c
(2)
1 = 0; c
(1)
2 = λ1, c
(2)
2 = λ1ηv
2; c(1)m = c
(2)
m = 0,∀m > 2. (71)
Now, we can insert (71) into (66) and obtain
p(y3) = e
ln(2)(c
(1)
0 H0(y3)+c
(1)
2 H2(y3))
(a)
= eln(2)(c
(1)
0 −c(1)2 )eln(2)c
(1)
2 y
2
3 , (72)
where (a) follows from the definition of Hermitian polynomials, i.e., H0(y3) = 1 and H2(y3) = y23−1.
The expression given by (72) can only be a valid probability distribution iff c(1)2 < 0, in which case
p(y3) would be distributed according to a normal distribution. Consequently, x2 would also be a
Gaussian RV. However, since λ1 ≥ 0, this would not be possible, thus p(y3) can not be a continuous
probability distribution. A similar argument would follow for p(z3) in (66), and it would lead to an
identical conclusion since λ1ηv2 can not be negative.
Case 2: Let us assume PEHU(x2, v) > 0. By using a Taylor series expansion we can rewrite the
log(.) function in (63) as
1
2
log
(
1 +
v2PEHU(x2, v)
σ22 + x
2
2α2
)
=
1
2
∞∑
n=0
(−1)nanx2n2 , (73)
therefore (63) can be written as
∞∑
m=0
(c(2)m − c(1)m )xm2 =
1
2
∞∑
n=0
(−1)nanx2n2 − λ1x22 − µ1 − λ2
(
(1− η(q¯12 + α1))PEHU(x2, v)− ηv2x22
)
.
(74)
In (73) and (74), an > 0 are known constants. By applying the same procedure as in Case 1, we
obtain c(2)m and c
(1)
m as
c
(1)
0 = λ2PEHU(x2, v) + µ1, c
(2)
0 =
1
2
an + λ2η(q¯1
2 + α1)PEHU(x2, v); c
(1)
1 = c
(2)
1 = 0;
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c
(1)
2 = λ1, c
(2)
2 = λ1ηv
2; c(1)m = 0, c
(2)
m =
1
2
am/2, ∀m > 2 ∧m is even
c(1)m = c
(2)
m = 0, ∀m > 2 ∧m is odd. (75)
Consequently,
p(y3) = e
ln(2)(c
(1)
0 H0(y3)+c
(1)
2 H2(y3))
(a)
= eln(2)(c
(1)
0 −c(1)2 )eln(2)c
(1)
2 y
2
3 , (76)
however, λ1 ≥ 0, so c(1)2 is positive, thus p(y3) can not be a valid continuous distribution. As for
p(z3), we have
p(z3) = e
ln(2)
∑∞
m=0 c
(2)
m Hm(z3) (a)= eln(2)
∑∞
n=0 qnz
2n
3 =
∞∏
n=0
eln(2)qnz
2n
3 , (77)
where (a) follows from the fact that c(2)m > 0 only for even values of m and qn are known non-zero
constants, whose value is determined by the polynomials and an. Since qn > 0 for some n → ∞,
p(z3) is unbounded, and as a result p(x2) can not be continues. Considering Case 1 and Case 2, we
obtain that p(x2|v) has to be discrete on the entire domain of x2. Now, we generate every discrete
probability distribution satisfying C1 in (60) and settle on the probability distribution which maximizes
the secrecy rate.
In order to obtain I(X1;Y3|V = v,G = g, F = f), we use the definition of mutual information,
and we can write
I(X1;Y3|V = v,G = g, F = f)
= H(Y3|V = v,G = g, F = f)−H(Y3|X1 = x1, V = v,G = g, F = f)
=
(∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2piσy3
J∑
j=1
p(x2 = x2j)e
− (y3−x2j)
2
2σ2y3 × ln
(
1√
2piσy3
J∑
j=1
p(x2 = x2j)e
− (y3−x2j)
2
2σ2y3
)
dy3
−
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2piσ3
J∑
j=1
p(x2 = x2j)e
− (z−x2j)
2
2σ23 × ln
(
1√
2piσ3
J∑
j=1
p(x2 = x2j) e
− (z−x2j)
2
2σ23
)
dz3
)
, (78)
where the last equality is a consequence of the definition of entropy. Finally, by using (78) we obtain
the upper bound as given in Theorem 2.
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